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ABSTRACT
The World Wide Web is a massive network of interlinked docu-
ments. One of the reasons the World Wide Web is so successful is
the fact that most content is available free of any charge. Inspired
by the success of the World Wide Web, the Web of Data applies the
same strategy of interlinking to data. To this point, most of data
in the Web of Data is also free of charge. The fact that the data is
freely available raises the question of financing these services, how-
ever. As we will discuss in this paper, advertisement and donations
cannot easily be applied to this new setting.
To create incentives to subsidize data providers, we propose that
sponsors should pay the providers to promote sponsored data. In
return, sponsored data will be privileged over non-sponsored data.
Since it is not possible to enforce a certain ordering on the data
the user will receive, we propose to split up the data into different
batches and deliver these batches with different delays. In this
way, we can privilege sponsored data without withholding any
non-sponsored data from the user.
In this paper, we introduce a new concept of a delayed-answer
auction, where sponsors can pay to prioritize their data. We intro-
duce a new model which captures the particular situation when a
user access data in the Web of Data. We show how the weighted
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction mechanism can be applied to our
scenario and we discuss how certain parameters can influence the
nature of our auction. With our new concept, we build a first step
to a free yet financial sustainable Web of Data.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Web of Data (WoD) is the result of applying the principle of
interlinking documents, which fueled to growth of the World Wide
Web, to data, which results in so called Linked Data. Like in its
predecessor, the WWW, most content of the WoD is to date free of
any charge. Allowing users to access Linked Data for free introduces
new challenges when it comes to financing these services. The
question we are answering in this paper is: How can the WoD be
free and financially sustainable at the same time?
The World Wide Web is not only the inspiration of the Web of
Data but also serves as an example of how to finance such services.
Hence, it is natural to think about applying the techniques which
finance the WWW to the WoD. One of the biggest financial motors
of the WWW is advertisement. What made advertisement in the
WWW more efficient than in other medias is the fact that adver-
tisement in the WWW is customized to the user. Hence, it is easier
for advertisers to target a specific user group. This customization
is mainly achieved either by showing an ad based on a keyword
entered in a search page or by embedding ads which are related to
a certain webpage’s content. Unfortunately, these techniques do
not apply that easily to the WoD. The main problem of the WoD
with respect to advertisement is that the data provider has no in-
fluence on how the content is presented to the user: In the WWW,
advertisement can be added to the presentation of the content at
the discretion of the data provider. In the WoD, however, a user re-
ceives the data in a structured format. This structured format allows
algorithms to automatically process the data further, if needed, and
does not provide the means to add any additional advertisements.
Accessing the WoD from a user’s perspective is more similar to
accessing a database than accessing a website’s content.
Donations could be an alternative to financing the WoD.
Wikipedia is an example of a content provider in the WWW which
is financed by donations. However, a significant part of the users is
not aware that there is a possibility to donate to Wikipedia or do
not know how to donate [13]. Such a lack of awareness for the need
of donations will be even more pronounced in the WoD. Users in
the WoD often access a lot of datasets at the same time. Sometimes
these datasets are part of a federation and can be accessed trans-
parently through a single accessing point. Very often, a user might
simply not be aware of using a certain dataset let alone realizing
that the provider requires financial support through donations.
To remedy this situation, we propose that sponsors who are in-
terested in promoting certain data will subsidize all data provider
which are involved in creating the specific solution containing the
subsidized data. A sponsor can be anybody who gains an advantage
if certain data is distributed to as much users as possible. However,
this means that we need a way to privilege highly sponsored over
less sponsored or non-sponsored data. In the WWW, search en-
gines, for example, can change the ordering of search results to
privilege certain websites and order advertisements on the search
result page based on the payments. In the WoD, the query language
SPARQL [17] which is used to query the desired data allows a user
to specify the ordering of the received data. Even if we disable such
a functionality, the structured format in which the data is delivered
easily allows a user, or the program which is querying on behalf
the user, to reorder the received data ad libitum. This means that it
is not possible to force a certain ranking of the received data upon
the user within a single query answer. One alternative is to simply
deliver only part of the available data and withhold the rest. Data
would then be delivered or not based on the amount of sponsorship
the data received. This would create a situation where different
sponsors compete to be part of the delivered data. Whereas such a
situation would create enough competition between sponsors to
ensure a certain revenue, it opposes the idea that all data should
be freely available. Hence, we propose a new concept where the
requested data is delayed depending on how much a certain spon-
sor is willing to pay for its data being privileged over the data of
other sponsors. Our new concept is aligned with the idea that all
data is freely available but creates at the same time an incentive for
sponsors to promote certain data. The revenue generated by our
concepts can be used to finance the providers which are responsible
for hosting and maintaining the data.
By delaying part of the data requested by a user, we are harming
the user’s experience to a certain degree. Obviously, a user would
prefer to get all requested data immediately instead of receiving
the data in consecutively delayed batches. We discuss the user’s
experience in detail in Section 6.3. In addition, a user would prefer
to receive data in an unbiased way instead of receiving first the data
which received the highest sponsoring. To remedy this problem,
we introduce an extension to our model in Section 7 where part of
the data is randomly assigned to batches.
The contributions of our paper are: (1) we introduce our new
concept of a delayed-answer auction where sponsors can pay to
have sponsored data delivered quicker to the user, (2) we introduce
a new link selection model (akin to click models in the WWW)
which captures the probability that a user selects a link contained
in a certain solution, (3) we show how the weighted VCG auction
mechanism can be applied to our scenario and we discuss how
certain parameters of the auction can influence the nature of our
auction, and (4) we discuss an extension to our model where only
part of the data delivery is influenced by the sponsors.
2 MOTIVATION
Imagine a user who wants to make a reservation for a restaurant
in Zurich, having a rating of at least 8.0, and which is offering
traditional food. Such a user can use the query language SPARQL
[17] to express the exact needs. Compared to a keyword based
searched in the WWW, such a semantic search is much more precise
when it comes to expressing which data the user actually wants.
Listing 1 shows how a SPARQL query for our example could look
like.
Listing 1: A query which asks for traditional restaurants in
Zurich with a ranking of at least 8.0.
SELECT ?name ?link
WHERE {
?restaurant :City ex:Zurich .
?restaurant :Food_Style :Traditional .
?restaurant :Reservation_Link ?link .
?restuarant :ranking ?rank . FILTER (?rank >= 8) }
The user issuing the SPARQL query from Listing 1 has an in-
centive to make a reservation for a restaurant with the desired
properties as quick and straightforward as possible. Meanwhile,
the different restaurants have an incentive that the user makes
the reservation at their own restaurant and not at the competition.
Assume now that the different solutions for the query arrive at the
user with different delays, e.g., the first solution will appear imme-
diately, the second solution after a few seconds, the third solution
even a few seconds later, and so on. It is not hard to imagine that
the user would not wait an hour for all thousands of solutions to
appear. Instead, a user would probably only wait a few seconds
before picking one of the already available solutions and make the
reservation. Indeed, as [20] implied, users become very inpatient
over time and even a delay of 250ms can influence a user to visit a
website of a close competitor. Similar, [16] argue how important
latency is for the user’s experience of a website. An experiment at
Amazon showed that a delay of 100ms resulted in sale decrease of
1% [18]. Also, an experiment at Google showed that if the time to
display search results is increased by 500ms, the revenue is reduced
by 20% [18]. Finally, experiments at Microsoft Live Search showed
that when the research result page is slowed down by a second, ad
clicks per user decline by 1.5%, and even by 4.4% when the delay is
two seconds [18].
Based on these findings, we developed a model for delaying
solutions for SPARQL query answers where sponsors can paymoney
to prioritize certain solutions and delay others. Using this strategy
of delaying part of the query answer, we manage to discriminate
different solutions. Similar to a user clicking on a link in the WWW,
a user (or program acting on behalf of a user) can decide to look up
a certain URI contained in a solution for a query answer. A sponsor
is motivated to pay money whenever such a URI lookup directs the
user to some service. In our example, the offered service could be
a reservation system for the respective restaurant. We will denote
URIs which direct a user to some service as service link, or just
link, to distinguish it from other URIs. Depending on how much
a sponsor is willing to pay for a visited service link, a solution
containing that link might be more or less prioritized. If a user
looks up a service link, all the data provider involved in creating
the specific solution will receive a share of the money the sponsor is
paying. In particular, the provider offering the rankings of different
restaurants gets paid for its service.
In Section 4 we discuss our concept of delaying solutions in
more detail and in Section 5 we introduce a formal model for our
concept. Note that our model is targeted at query answers for which
a delay influences the likelihood that the user will consider a certain
solution. This is not always the case. For some queries, a user does
not mind waiting a long time receiving an answer. Hence, it is
important to keep in mind that our concept is specifically designed
for situations were such delays do matter.
3 RELATEDWORK
Auctions for Sponsored Search Results: Before Google intro-
duced the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction in 2002, first
price models were used for selling ads on search result pages [27].
The idea of the GSP auction is that each bidder submits one bid,
which indicates the bidders value for a click. Different positions (or
slots) on the search result page will have different click-through
rates. Hence, the bidders value per click translates into a value
per slot. Depending on the auctioneer, different ads might have
different click-through rates for the same slot, adding an additional
layer of complexity. In the simplest variation of the GSP auction,
the first slot is given to the bidder declaring the highest value, the
second slot to the bidder with the next highest value, and so on.
What gives the name to the GSP auction is the fact that each bidder
pays a price which equals the value of the next lowest bidder, also
known as the second price. [11]
The advantage of the GSP auction over first price models is
that the GSP auction prevents “cycling” patterns, a situation where
prices gradually rise until a sudden drop occurs and the pattern
starts over [10]. Shortly after Google implemented the GSP auction,
one of their engineers realized that a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
auction [7, 14, 26] could also be implemented to sell ad positions
on their search results pages. The advantage of the VCG auction is
that it is truthful, which means that each bidder has an incentive to
report their true value as bid. Google refrained from replacing the
GSP with the VCG auction because the GSP auction was already
growing attention and there would have been additional effort
involved, both on the side of Google and the sellers, to change to
the VCG auction. [25]
In [1], Aggarwal et al. propose a position-based auctions mecha-
nism where bidders can impose additional constraints on the po-
sitions they want their ad to appear. The motivation behind this
auction format is that a bidder might have a value if the ad just
appears at the top of a search result page, even if the user does not
click the ad, because the mere appearance of the ad increases the
visibility of the brand.
In theWoD setting, it is unclear which of these auctions are appli-
cable. In section 5.3 we will show how the VCG auction mechanism
can be applied to our setting.
Click Models for Web Search and Sponsored Search Auc-
tions: Both web search and sponsored search auctions need click
models for estimating how likely a user would select a certain
search result or a certain ad. Hence, the different models used in
these two fields are often overlapping and can often be used in the
other field.
The simplest models for user clicks on advertisements is based
on the assumption that click-through rates can be separated into
two factors: one factor which is only influenced by the ad which
wins the slot and one factor which is only influenced by the slot
position itself. The result of this assumption, called the separability
assumption, is that the click-through rate of a certain ad winning a
certain slot can be computed by just multiplying these two factors,
without having to consider which ads are winning all the other
slots. In settings where the click-through rates are not separable, a
weighted VCG mechanism may not apply. [3]
The click model of [23] provides one example of such separable
factors: the influence of the slot is described as the probability that
a user sees an ad at a specific position. The influence of the ad is
described as the probability that the user clicks on the ad given that
the user saw the ad. Note that it is assumed that those probabilities
are independent of the ads already shown to the user.
Aggarwal et al. [2] introduce a Markovian user model where the
user scans a list of ads and makes a decision whether to (1) click on
the ad, (2) continue scanning the list, or (3) abort the inspections of
the ads. Note that in this model, the probability that a user clicks on
a certain ad does not only depend on the ad itself and the position
but also on the ads placed in higher slots. Hence, the separability
assumption does not hold anymore in this model. A consequence
of this is that the GSP allocation of ads is not anymore the most
efficient allocation [2]. Similar to the model of [2], [8] introduces a
cascading model for search results where each document is either
clicked or skipped. In the latter case, the user continues the scanning
of the list of results.
One drawback of the models of [2] and [8] is that it is assumed
that a user will only continue scanning the ads/search results if no
previous ad/search result has been clicked, yet, and hence, assuming
that the user will click at most on one ad/search result during the
scanning process. [15] introduced the dependent click model which
extends the cascading model by introducing conditional probabili-
ties of a user to continue scanning the list of results depending on
whether a click occurred on the current document or not and hence,
allowing for multiple clicks within a single scanning process.
In [28], Zhu et al. introduce their General Click Model which is a
more general model for user clicks. Most existing models can be
considered a special case of their general model and they showed,
for example, that the models of [23] and [8] can be modelled using
their General Click Model.
As described in Section 2, a user (or program) can visit certain
service links, which are URIs which direct the user to some service.
Selecting such a service link is very similar to a user clicking on a
link in the WWW. However, despite the variety of click models for
web search and sponsored search auctions, none of them captures
the situationwhen a user selects a service link from a set of solutions
for a SPARQL query. Hence, in Section 5.1 we introduce a new
selection model which we designed especially for SPARQL query
answers.
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Figure 1: A user gets a delayed query answer based on the
bids of sponsors.
4 DELAYED-ANSWER AUCTION
In this section, we introduce our concept of a delayed-answer auction.
At the core of our concept lies the ability of sponsors to pay money
if a user follows a certain service link contained in a query solution.
The data is accessible in form of a SPARQL endpoint. Our auction
mechanism makes sure that solutions containing links with higher
bids appear with a smaller delay than solutions containing links
with lower bids. Hence, our auction mechanism creates a ranking
of the solutions by introducing different delays for them.
The user who poses the SPARQL query and the data providers
which offer the data needed to answer the query define the context
of our auction. Given this context, the sponsors are the participants
(or bidder) in the auction. Hence, wewill use the expressions sponsor
and bidder interchangeably. The bidders place a bid on a specific
link contained in a query solution. This bid indicates how much
the sponsor is willing to pay if the user visits a certain service link.
We call a service link which has a bid placed on it a sponsored link.
In our concept, we make the simplifying assumption that each
solution contains at most one sponsored link. This means that each
solution can be associated with one sponsor and one bid. If nobody
is bidding on a link contained in a solution or the solution contains
no link at all, the bid is set to 0. We discuss the more general case
when there might be multiple sponsored links in a single solution
in the limitations in Section 8. If a user visits a link contained in a
solution for a query answer, the visit of the service link is registered
at the auctioneer and the placed bid is charged to the respective
bidder. The revenue generated by the auction is used to finance all
the entities involved in providing the data which were needed to
create the solutions for the query answer.
Figure 1 illustrates the process of our delayed-answer auction
concept. A user submits a query to the auction. The auction exe-
cutes the query and generates the query answer. Parts of the query
answer get delayed, depending on how much the sponsors bid on
certain links contained in the solutions. Figure 2 illustrates how
the money gets redistributed by the auction to the providers which
were involved in creating the query answer. The service link which
is visited directs the user to the auction which, in turn, redirects
the user to the appropriate location. This redirecting mechanism is
important to keep track of which links are visited.
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Figure 2: If a user visits a link, the sponsor of that link
pays the auction which distributes the money among the
providers.
To achieve the link redirection functionality, the auction has
to replace each occurrence of a sponsored link with a new link
that directs the user to the auction when visited. The auction has
to track which link replacement corresponds to which original
link and redirect the user (or program), accordingly. The revenue
generated by the auction is used to finance the provider of the data.
Not only the provider providing the sponsored link but all providers
providing any relevant data for the solution which contained the
visited link gets a share of the revenue. In addition, it is possible
to use part of the revenue to subsidize providers which were not
so lucky and could not (or not enough) contribute to different
sponsored links to cover the operation costs of their services. The
exact distribution of the revenue among the providers is beyond
the scope of this paper, however. It is important to note that for the
auction to work properly, the providers and the auction need to
build a closed system, meaning that the providers’ data are only
accessible through the auction itself and cannot be accessed directly
by the user. If the providers and the auction would not build a
closed system, a user could circumvent the auction mechanism and
directly query the provider’s data without suffering from the delays
introduced by the auction.
Note that delaying certain solutions is not part of the standard
SPARQL protocol [12]. Instead, the query answer must be offered
as a stream of solutions. There are various extensions of SPARQL
which offer the possibility to return solutions in form of a stream [4–
6, 9, 19, 22, 24]. A detailed discussion of the advantages or disad-
vantages of the different streaming solutions is beyond the scope
of this paper, however.
5 FORMAL MODEL
In this section, we introduce the formal model of our concept. First,
we introduce our new link selection model and then, we discuss
the how this model can be applied to a weighted VCG auction.
5.1 Batch Link Model
Our Batch Link Model differs from traditional models for sponsored
search results. In click models for sponsored search results an ad is
shown to a user if a bidder bids on a certain keyword. This relevance
of different ads for a specific keyword can differ quite a lot because
(1) the keyword entered by a user can be ambiguous or unspecific
because of the lack of any semantics and (2) an advertiser can decide
to bid for a certain keyword, even if the ad is not very relevant. In
a semantic search, the ambiguity is mostly removed and, given that
the user, or a program acting on behalf of the user, formulated the
query diligently enough, the lack of specificity as well. In addition,
a bidder cannot force a certain service link to be part of the query
answer by increasing the bid enough. Instead, only links which
actually match the query are allowed to be in the query answer.
Hence, in our model, we assume that each service link i contained
in a solution for a query answer has the same probability prel of
being relevant for the query. The probability prel depends on the
query the user issued and has to be estimated by the auction.
The model assumes that a user will select and visit only service
links which are considered relevant for the query. In addition, a user
will visit at most one link. Themotivation for this assumption is that,
in contrast to advertisement in search result pages, a SPARQL query
returns the user exactly those links which are of interest for the
user, due to the nature of the semantic search. The user can judge
the relevancy of the service link by the information embedded in
the solution which contains the link. This is different from aWWW
search, where users often have to follow a link to discover whether
the content provided by the webpage is actually relevant.
If more than one service link is delivered, the user has to decide
which of the relevant links to select. Assume that there are n differ-
ent links, each having a probability of prel of being relevant to the
user. The probability that service link i is the only relevant link is:
prel · (1 − prel)n−1 (1)
In this case, the user will visit this one link because it is to only one
relevant.
However, there might be more than one relevant link. In case
there are two relevant service links, each relevant link has the
same probability of being visited. Hence, the probability the user
will select service link i is half the probability that one of the two
relevant links is selected:
(prel)
2 · (1 − prel)n−2
2 (2)
In total, there are (n − 1) cases having two relevant service links
where one of them is link i . In general, there are
(n−1
k−1
)
cases having
k relevant service links where one of them is link i . If we combine
all possible cases, we get the formula for the probability psel (n) of
a link i being selected:
Definition 5.1. Given n links with a probability of prel of being
relevant to the user, we define psel (n) as
psel (n) :=
n∑
j=1
(
n − 1
j − 1
)
· (prel)
j · (1 − prel)n−j
j
(3)
Corollary 5.2.
psel (n) :=
1 − (1 − prel)n
n
(4)
Proof.
n∑
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Figure 3: Probability that a user waits for the solutions to be
delivered.
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n∑
j=1
(
n − 1
j − 1
)
· n
j
· (prel)
j · (1 − prel)n−j
n
=
n∑
j=1
(n
j
)
· (prel) j · (1 − prel)n−j
n
=
*,
n∑
j=0
(n
j
)
· (prel) j · (1 − prel)n−j+- − (1 − prel)n
n
=
1 − (1 − prel)n
n
(5)
where the last equality holds because the sum in brackets is the
distribution formula of the binomial distribution. □
Introducing delays into the delivery of results adds an additional
layer of complexity to our batch link model. Figure 3 shows an
example of how the probability can decrease over time. In this
example, the first batch is delivered in slightly less than 3 seconds
and the second one after almost 7 seconds. The probability that
the user waits until the first batch of solutions arrives is around
55%. The probability that the user waits until the second batch of
solutions also arrives is around 25%. The probabilities ∆p1 and ∆p2
indicate how likely it is that the user stops waiting after receiving
batch 1 and batch 2, respectively, and chooses one of the relevant
links received. Let nj be the number of solutions contained in batch
j . We can now define the probability of a link inside a specific batch
being selected:
Definition 5.3. Let there be m batches containing n1, . . . ,nm
query solutions, each batch j having a probability of ∆pj of be-
ing the last one received by the user. A link i contained in batch
b (i ) has the following probability pseli of being selected by the user:
pseli :=
m∑
j=b (i )
∆pj · psel (Nj ) , (6)
where Nj =
j∑
k=1
nk
We also define a probability ∆p0 which indicates the likelihood
that the user does not wait for the first solution to arrive.
5.2 Ranking Function
To decide which solution should be placed in which batch, they have
to be ranked according to the bids placed on the links. There are
two well-known ways of ranking the links, either by ranking them
by the bids placed on them or by their revenue, which is the proba-
bility of being selected times the bid. Because of our assumption
that the different links have the same probability of being relevant
for the user, two different links will have the same probability of
being selected for the same position in the ranking. In addition,
the probability of being selected is monotonically decreasing with
respect to the position. This means that ranking the links by bids
results in the same ranking as ranking them by revenue. Hence,
we can just order the solutions by the bids they contain to achieve
a ranking by revenue. If two links receive the exact same bid, the
ranking among the solutions is determined randomly. Note that
using a ranking function is not compatible with a user specified
order of the solutions and hence, ORDER-BY clauses in SPARQL
queries are not supported by our model.
After the solutions are ranked according to the bids on the links
they contain, the solutions can be assigned to the different batches.
Let nj the amount of solutions contained in batch j. The first n1
solutions will be assigned to the first batch, the next n2 solutions
to the second batch, and so on. The parameters n1, . . . ,nm as well
as the delay of the different batches have to be determined in ad-
vance. The size of the different batches and the delays determine
the probability for the different service links of being selected.
5.3 Weighted VCG
We use the weighted VCG auction [21] to determine the prices
the different bidders must pay for each visit by a user. We use this
auction mechanism because it is truthful, which means that the
best strategy for each bidder in this auction is to place a bid which
equals their value for a visit by the user. The bidder’s value for a
visit is the maximal amount the bidder would be willing to pay
for a user’s visit. Since the auction is truthful, we will assume that
the bidders are bidding their true value and we will use the two
expressions bid and value interchangeably.
The probabilities which are given by the batches, the delays, and
the probability prel are needed to calculate the prices the sponsors
have to pay if the user visits a service link. The VCG price πi for a
link i is based on the “harm” the bidder imposes on all other bidders.
This harm can be calculated by the difference of the revenue all
other bidders would have if there were no bid on link i minus the
revenue all other bidders have because there is a bid on link i . The
revenue of bidder i must be equal to this difference.
Definition 5.4. Given n links with probabilities psel1 , . . . ,pseln
and bids v1, . . . ,vn . The weighted VCG price πi for link i is:
πi :=
n∑
j=1
j,i
vj ·
(
p=iselj − pselj
)
pseli
(7)
where p=iselj denotes the probability of link j being visited if there
were no bid on link i .
We show now how this price can be computed more efficiently.
For this, we need the following definition:
Definition 5.5. For a link j in batch b (j ), we define the 2nd value
v2ndj as the highest bid of the next batch b (j ) + 1. If j is in the last
batch bmax, we define the 2nd value to be 0:
v2ndj :=
max{vk : b (k ) = b (j ) + 1}, for j < bmax0, for j = bmax (8)
Intuitively, the 2nd value v2ndi is a lower bound for a bid v for
staying in batch b (i ). As long asv > v2ndi , the link can stay in batch
b (i ). If v = v2ndi , it is not guaranteed that link i stays in the same
batch because the ranking among all links with the same value is
random. Finally, ifv < v2ndi , the link ends up in a next higher batch.
Using this definition, we can state the following theorem:
Theorem 5.6. The weighted VCG price πi for a link i is given by:
πi =
m∑
j=b (i )
v2ndj · ∆pj · psel (Nj )
pseli
(9)
wherem is the total number of batches.
Proof. Equation 7 gives the general form of the weighted VCG
price. The first observation is that p=iselj = pselj for any link j which
is positioned before link i , as their position does not change when
the bid on link i is removed. For any link j positioned after link i ,
the probability p=iselj changes only if link j ends up in a different
batch because of the removal of the bid on link i .
There might be multiple service links which have a zero bid on
them. Any change in the rankings among links without any bid
yields vj ·
(
p=iselj − pselj
)
= 0 because vj = 0 and hence, it does not
affect the price. Hence, without loss of generality, we can assume
that link i gets the last possible position in the ranking when the
bid is removed.
If link i receives the last position, the link with the highest value
in each batch between b (i ) and bmax ends up in a next lower batch.
This means that vj ·
(
p=iselj − pselj
)
can only be non-zero if vj =
v2ndb (j )−1 that is, if vj is the highest value inside its batch b (j ) and
hence, the second value of the next higher batch. In these cases, the
difference p=iselj and pselj is exactly:
∆pj · psel (Nj ) (10)
by Equation 6. Hence:
n∑
j=1
l,i
vj ·
(
p=iselj − pselj
)
=
m∑
j=b (i )
v2ndj · ∆pj · psel (Nj ) (11)
□
6 OPTIMIZING BATCH SIZES AND DELAYS
There are two sets of parameters we must control when setting up
the delay auction: the batch sizes n1, . . . ,nm and their probabilities
∆p1, . . . ,∆pm .
Remember that we have a probability ∆p0 indicating how likely
it is that the user does not wait for the first batch of solutions to
arrive. The probability ∆p0 is given by the user model and cannot
be set by the auction designer. In addition, we set a threshold tmax
which indicates the maximal amount of time we are willing to let
the user wait until the last solution arrives. The threshold tmax
maps to a probability pmax that the user waits for the last batch to
arrive.
Let there be n different links. We have three constraints:
m∑
i=1
ni = n , (12)
m∑
i=1
∆pi = 1 − ∆p0 , (13)
and
∆pm ≥ pmax . (14)
After the probabilities ∆p1, . . . ,∆pm are determined, the delays
of the batches can be chosen to match the desired probabilities.
Note that the parameters n1, . . . ,nm and ∆p1, . . . ,∆pm cannot
be decided ad hoc when the bids are received. If one would try
to optimize the parameters given the bids one would render the
auction untruthful despite the use of the weighted VCGmechanism.
This is because before the mechanism is applied, the bidders could
manipulate the parameters of the auction by manipulating their
bids. Hence, the optimizations we discuss in this section have to
be done based on what values have to be expected coming up in
future auctions.
6.1 Optimizing Revenue
The revenue r generated by our auction mechanism is the sum
of the VCG payments of all sponsors involved in a specific query
answer. Aswe showed in Section 5.3, the payments can be calculated
according to Equation 7. The total revenue generated by the auction
is:
r =
n∑
i=1
πi · pseli (15)
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=b (i )
v2ndj · ∆pj · psel (Nj )
If we concentrate first on the best choice for the probabilities
∆p1, . . . ,∆pm , we see that the revenue is a linear function with
respect to those probabilities. This means that the revenue is maxi-
mized when one of the probabilities is set to 1 and all others to 0. Let
∆pmax be the probability which maximizes the revenue when set
to 1. If we also consider the constraint in Equations 13 and 14, the
revenue is maximized when ∆pmax = 1 − ∆p0 and ∆pm = pmax or,
ifmax =m, ∆pmax = 1 − ∆p0, respectively. All other probabilities
are set to 0. Setting ∆pj = 0 means that batch j has the same delay
as the next batch j + 1 and practically, they become one batch.
Optimizing the batch sizes is not as straightforward as optimizing
the probabilities. But, since there are at most two batches remaining
after optimizing the probabilities, the problem becomes easier. If
max = m the revenue is 0, as there is only one batch and hence,
the second value is 0. If there are two batches left we redefine the
two remaining probabilities as ∆p1 and ∆p2 and denote with n1 and
n2 the number of solutions in the two batches. We will denote the
revenue when having only two batches as r∗:
r∗ =
n1∑
j=1
v2nd1 · ∆p1 ·
1 − (1 − prel)n1
n1
= v2nd1 · (1 − ∆p0 − pmax) ·
(1 − (1 − prel)n1 ) (16)
Note that the value v2nd1 depends on the choice of n1. The only
way to optimize r∗ is to iterate through all possible values of n1.
Fortunately, the possible values for n1 are discrete and bounded by
n and hence, the problem can be solved in O (n) time.
6.2 Optimizing Social Welfare
The social welfare s generated by our auction mechanism is the
sum of the values of all links times the probability that the link is
visited. Since the auction is truthful, we can assume that the bids
equal the bidders actual value for being selected. Hence, the social
welfare is given by the following formula:
s =
n∑
i=1
vi · pseli
=
n∑
i=1
vi · *.,
m∑
j=b (i )
∆pj · psel (Nj )+/- (17)
The same argument which applies to maximizing the revenue
also applies here: the social welfare is a linear function with respect
to those probabilities, which is maximized if we set ∆pmax = 1 −
∆p0 − pmax and ∆pm = pmax, or ∆pmax = 1 − ∆p0, respectively,
and all others to 0. Again, to optimize social welfare the auctioneer
has to split the solutions into at most two batches. Similar to r∗, we
denote the social welfare when having two batches as s∗:
s∗ = *,
n1∑
i=1
vi+- · (1 − ∆p0 − pmax) · 1 − (1 − prel)
n1
n1
+
*,
n∑
i=1
vi+- · pmax · 1 − (1 − prel)
n
n
(18)
As with r∗, s∗ can be maximized by iterating through all possible
values for n1. There are two properties of the maximal value for s∗
worth noting. First, the parameter n1 which maximizes s∗ does not
maximize r∗ in general. This is easy to see when comparing Equa-
tion 16 with Equation 18: r∗ depends on the value v2nd1 whereas s∗
depends on all values. Second, choosing n1 = n does not maximize
s∗ in general. This is because the more solutions are included in the
first batch, the more likely it is that a solution having a low value
will be chosen.
6.3 Optimizing User Experience
The user’s experience is an important aspect of our auction we
have not discussed so far. Even if the data the auction is offering to
the user is for free, a user might switch to a competitor offering a
similar service if the competitor can offer a better user experience.
We have already seen that in both cases, optimizing revenue
and optimizing social welfare, the optimal choice of parameters
results in two batches, one delivered as fast as possible and the
second one delivered at time tmax. Delaying a potentially big chunk
of the available solutions for this maximal delay tmax might damp
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Figure 4: Value distribution for four different scenarios.
the user’s experience, however. Of course, the user would prefer to
receive all data in the first batch, which is delivered immediately.
However, as we have seen in the previous section, delivering all
data at once results in zero revenue and possibly suboptimal social
welfare. Fortunately, it is possible delaying some solutions without
impacting the user experience too much. The main argument is
that a user will need some time to consume the solutions contained
in a batch. If the delay of the next batch is not larger than the time
the user needs to consume the current batch, the user will be able
to seamlessly consume all the solution from the different batches.
Another aspect which can damp the user’s experience is the
fact that the delivery of the data is biased in the sense that highly
sponsored solutions are always delivered first. In Section 7, we
discuss an extension of our model which reduces this bias.
6.4 Simulation
In this section, we illustrate how revenue and social welfare behave
when there are only two batches. Figure 4 shows four different value
distributions which we labeled with Linear, Tableau, Dominant,
and Equal, respectively. For our simulation, we set ∆p0 = 0.05,
prel = 0.6, and pmax = 0.1.
Figure 5 shows the revenue for different choices of n1. The rev-
enue always starts at $0 for n1 = 0 and closes with $0 for n1 = 20.
This is no surprise, as in both cases all solutions are only assigned
to a single batch and hence, the second price is $0. There are two
remarkable observations about the revenue, however. First, for the
Tableau distribution, the revenue stays the same for n1 = 5 up to
n1 = 15. This happens because the second value stays constant
within this range, as the bids are all the same. Second, theDominant
and Equal distributions both have their maximum at n1 = 19. The
reason for this is that the highest bid within any distribution does
not influence the revenue.
Figure 6 shows the social welfare for different choices of n1. The
social welfare is always positive, no matter the choice of n1. For
the Equal distribution the social welfare is maximized for n1 = 20,
but does not change much after n1 is beyond seven. The values for
n1 which maximize the social welfare for the Linear and Tableau
distributions, respectively, are quite close to the ones which maxi-
mize their respective revenue. The Dominant distribution has its
maximum for the social welfare for n1 = 1. Increasing n1 further
increases the chance that a link with a lower value is chosen by
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Figure 5: Revenue for different values forn1 for the different
value distributions from Figure 4.
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Figure 6: Social welfare for different values for n1 for the
different value distributions from Figure 4.
the user and hence, decreases social welfare. The Dominant dis-
tribution illustrates how far away the values for n1 can be which
maximize social welfare and revenue, respectively.
7 EXTENSION
Tomitigate the bias our auction introduces by delivering the highest
sponsored data first, we propose an extension of our original model.
The idea of this extension is to auction off only part of the available
positions in the batches and assign the rest of them randomly. The
result of this extension is similar to what users experience when
using search engines: Part of the results is sponsored content and
ranked according to some bids, the other part of the results is
unbiased and only depends on what the user is searching for.
The first step in our extension is to designate some slots in each
batch which should be reserved for sponsored solutions. We will
denote with nsponsi and n
rand
i how many of the ni slots in batch
i are reserved for sponsored solutions or are assigned randomly,
respectively. The next step is to assign solutions to the random slots.
We denote with nspons and nrand the total number of sponsored
slots and random slots, respectively, and with n the total number of
slots, which equals the total number of solutions for the query. Note
that once we have assigned all random slots, there are n − nrand
solutions which did not receive any slot, yet. These solutions are
randomly arranged in a waiting queue, where the first link in the
queue will be the first one to occupy a newly open random slot.
The next step is to assign solutions to the sponsored slots. We
start with the assignment of the nspons1 slots in the first batch. For
this, we select the nspons1 solutions with the highest bid from all
those solutions which are not already assigned to the first batch
by the random assignment. This means that some of the solutions
get upgraded to the first batch. An upgraded solution can be either
one of the solutions in the waiting queue or one of the solution
which already had a randomly assigned slot. In the latter case, the
upgrading creates a new open position for a randomly assigned slot,
which is assigned to first link in the waiting queue. This procedure
is applied sequentially to the sponsored slots nspons2 to n
spons
m . For
every batch, we only consider those solutions which are currently
in a higher (and later) batch or the waiting queue.
Once we have the new ranking of the solutions, we can again
calculate the weighted VCG prices according to Definition 5.4. Note
that the Theorem 5.6 does not anymore apply to this new setting.
We conclude our extension with an example:
Example 7.1. Assume that there are four links with bids of $0, $10,
$20, and $30. The left part in Figure 7 shows a random assignment
of the bids $0 and $30. The other two bids, $10 and $20, are assigned
to the waiting queue. The bid $20 takes precedence over $10 inside
the queue. The right part in Figure 7 shows the final assignment
of the bids. The arrow labeled A indicates the first step of the
assignment of the sponsored slots: bid $30 gets to the first sponsored
slot, because it is the highest bid of those three bids, $30, $20, and
$10, which are not yet in batch 1. Next B , the bid $20 gets the
random slot previously occupied by $30, because bid $20 has the
priority in the queue. Finally C , bid $10 gets the last remaining
sponsored slot because it is the highest (and only) bid which did not
yet get a slot in batch 1 or 2. The weighted VCG price is $0 for all
solutions which got a randomly assigned slot, eventually, because
changing their bid to $0 does not influence any other assignments
of slots. This means that the bidders with bids $0 and $20 do not
pay if the user visits their link. The bidder with bid $10 also gets
a price of $0. This, because the bidder would have gotten in the
second batch even with a bid of $0. Finally, the weighted VCG price
for the bidder with $30 is the value all other bidders would have if
bid $30 would have been $0, minus the value all other bidders have
for the current assignment.
Assume that prel = 0.8, ∆p1 = 0.5, and ∆p2 = 0.4. Hence, the
probabilities of being selected for the two first slots are 0.20096
each, and for the second two slots 0.04096 each. If bid $30 would be
zero, the first sponsored slot would be assigned to bid $20 and the
first random slot would still belong to the bidder with the original
bid $0. The second sponsored slot would be assigned to bid $10.
The second random slot would be assigned to the bidder with the
original bid of $30. The total value of this assignment is $4.4288.
The value of all other bidders for the original assignment is $1.2288.
With a probability of 0.20096 of being selected, the weighted VCG
price for the bidder with bid $30 is $15.92, which has to be payed if
the user visits the link.
8 LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
We introduced a new concept of a delayed-anser auction to finance
free data in the WoD. As we have seen, the choice of parameters
can influence the generated revenue, generated social welfare, and
the user experience. In general, it is not possible to find parameters
which maximizes all three of them. Hence, it is the choice of the
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Figure 7: Example: four links get assigned to different slots.
auction designer to find a suitable trade-off between revenue, social
welfare, and user experience. We also discussed an extension which
reduces the bias we introduce by prioritizing solutions containing
links with high bids.
Our new auction model is not restricted to the use case of the
WoD. It can be applied to any setting where multiple bidders can
occupy the same slot and different slots have a decreasing probabil-
ity of being selected. An additional restriction is that we assume
that all solutions have the same relevance to the user. As we dis-
cussed, this assumption is reasonable in the WoD setting. In other
settings, this assumption might not apply. In this case, the auction
might become more complicated because the probabilities of being
selected might not be separable anymore and hence, the weighted
VCG auction is not applicable.
One additional assumption we made is that there is only one
sponsor per solution. While this assumption might be true in most
cases, it is possible that a user might issue a query which contains
multiple sponsored links per solution. In such situations, the bid
per solution can be defined as the sum of the bids for each link
contained in the solution. With this definition, we could still apply
our auction model, but we would have to find a way to distribute
the weighted VCG payment among the bidders which placed a bid
on the same solution. If one decides to distribute the payments
proportional to the bids placed on the links, the auction would not
anymore be truthful, however.
What is left for future work is the distribution of the generated
revenue among the data providers. The revenue can be used to
finance those providers which proved to be important for answering
queries or subsidize those providers which struggle the most to
keep their services running.
With our concept of a delayed-answer auction, we provided
a first sponsored auction model for the Web of Data. Whatever
the limitations of our concept are, it represents a first model for a
financially sustainable and free Web of Data.
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